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Statutory Interpretation: The Uses
and Anatomy of Context
Reed Dickerson
Every communication that is generated by a written instrument con-
sists of two elements which must be considered in arriving at the mean-
ing of the communication. Those elements are: (1) the written vehicle
itself, and (2) its surrounding context. The surrounding context which
thus completes the communication consists only of those underlying cul-
tural aspects which, when considered in relation to the written vehicle,
are: (1) relevant to the written vehicle, (2) reliable, (3) shared by the
author and the audience, and (4) relied on by both author and audience
to complete the communication. The author suggests that those cultural
elements which at first appear to be part of the context of a statute, but
which do not meet the listed criteria, are not properly part of the context
to which a court may look in its cognitive function of interpreting statutes.
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE COMMUNICATION of meaning there are two main
elements: (1) the vehicle of communication specially created
and controlled by its author; and (2) the surrounding context with-
in which that vehicle operates.' No communication is complete
without both.'
TE ATHOR: F. REED DICKERSON Although the two elements
(A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard are interdependent, an under-
University; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia Uni- standing of the distinction be-
versity) is a Professor of Law at Indiana
University, and is a member of the Mas- tween them is important. In
sachusetts and Illinois Bars. He is pres- the search for the meaning of a
ently serving as Commissioner for
Indiana, National Conference of Corn- particular communication, the
missioners on Uniform State Laws; and vehicle occupies a central posi-
as Chairman, Standing Committee on tion in the field of relevant con-
Legal Drafting, American Bar Assoda-
tion. He is the author of The Funda- siderations and is thus inher-
mentals of Legal Drafting (1965). ently preeminent over the pe-
ripheral context. The func-
tional difference is perhaps best described in terms of Polanyi's dis-
1 Although context is constantly referred to, its structure and specific functions are
only rarely discussed. See E. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959); B. SHARTEL,
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND How IT OPERATES 328-49 (1951).
2 "[People can only communicate among themselves because they share a common
culture." E. NIDA, MESSAGE AIND MISSION 35 (1960). "Communication never takes
place in a social vacuum, but always between individuals who are part of a total social
context." Id. at 94. This is universally accepted by language experts. See, e.g., C.
CHEImRRY, ON HUMAN CoMMUNIcATiON 10 (2d ed. 1966). Most legal authorities
would hasten to agree that "any serious effort on the part of judges to discover the thought
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tinction, made in a different connection, between the area of "focal
awareness" and the area of "subsidiary awareness."'  The simplest
analog is our field of vision, where, despite the absence of a discern-
ible line of demarcation, we make a crude distinction between cen-
tral vision and peripheral vision. Objects seen only with the former
lose much of their significance or meaning without the contextual
cues provided by the latter. An analog with a sharper line of dis-
tinction would be the engagement ring - a precious stone enhanced
by its metal setting.
Whether the line between language vehicle and surrounding
context is easy or hard to draw, the distinction is significant, espe-
cially in statutory interpretation. Apart from the inherent preemi-
nence of the focal over the peripheral, the standard criteria for in-
terpreting statutes imply a vital distinction between what is enacted
and what is not.
In the interpretation of a written document, the document itself
plays the key role in directing, orienting, and organizing the total
message, including the relevant elements of surrounding context.4
Therefore, the first step in interpretation is to gather all the related
utterances by which the author has transmitted the particular mes-
sage. Before we ask, "What does this document mean?", we must
ask, "What documents are we interpreting?" In some instances, the
legislative message is a part of a statute. In others, it is an entire
statute, including its amendments. In still others, it is a group of
statutes or of parts of statutes.
When there are two or more documents under consideration, it
is significant whether those documents were intended to complement
each other, and thus to constitute an integrated whole, or were ut-
tered independently. In the latter instance, the document to be in-
or reference behind the language of a statute must be based on a painstaking endeavor to
reconstruct the setting or context in which the statutory words were employed." Jones,
The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25
WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 3 (1939) (footnote omitted). Meaning is conveyed "by the aggre-
gate of our symbols interpreted in the surroundings of their use." Horack, The Disin-
tegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 338 (1949). "Any verbal dec-
laration, oral or written, must be interpreted against the cultural background in which
it is made.... This background is implied in all uses of language." B. SHARTEL, supra
note 1, at 330.
3 M. POLANYI, THE STUDY OF MAN 30 (1959).
4 If communication "is to be achieved at all (and the achievement is always imper-
fect at best) the common words must be chosen and contextualized with discriminating
suitability. Much of the context is constructed in the act and by the manner of saying
forth; it is not all previously given." P. WHEELWRIGHT, METAPHOR AND REALITY 170
(1962).
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terpreted is, of course, the most recent relevant one. The earlier
documents are, at best, merely parts of its context.
II. SURROUNDING CONTEXT
A. The Backdrop of Culture
What is the significance of the context in which a message is
read? It is highly improbable that any document, considered en-
tirely apart from the culture that it presupposes, can convey mean-
ing, except in another culture that shares some of the same cultural
elements.' Indeed, to suppose an effective communication entirely
apart from its cultural environment would be almost a self-contra-
diction. Obviously, any verbal communication must be expressed in
the language peculiar to the culture in which the communication
takes place. The essence of a language is to reflect, express, and per-
haps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and
values that identifies the culture to which the language belongs.6
5 See R. DIcKEasoN, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 21 (1965).
6 "The basic premise of the philosophy of language is that there is a strong rela-
tion between the form and content of language and the form and content of conceptuali-
zation." J. KATZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 4 (1966). Various commentators
have discussed this point. Sapir takes the position that:
The world of our experiences must be enormously simplified and generalized
before it is possible to make a symbolic inventory of all our experiences of
things and relations; and this inventory is imperative before we can convey
ideas. The elements of language, the symbols that ticket off experience, must
therefore be associated with whole groups, delimited classes, of experience
rather than with the single experiences themselves. E. SAPIR, LANGUAGE
11 (1921).
Whorf complements this position, observing that: "We cut nature up, organize it into
concepts, and ascribe significance as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement
to organize it in this way - an agreement that holds throughout our speech community
and is codified in the patterns of our language." Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42
THE TEcHNOLOGY REV. 231 (1940). "Ordinarily, language is the chief evidence for
the existence and character of thought... In the category which we have generically re-
ferred to as thought, perception must be included, as well as what may be called the con-
ceptual organization of experience." P. HENLE, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND CUL-
TURE 2, 3 (1958) (emphasis added). "'Culture' ... is both a condition and a product of
language." J. DEwEY, LOGIc THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 56 (1938). "The world
can be structured in many ways, and the language we learn as children directs the forma-
don of our particular structure. Language is not a cloak following the contours of
thought. Languages are molds into which infant minds are poured." Brown, Language
and Categories, in J. BRUNER, J. GOODNOW & G. AUSTIN, A STUDY OF THINKING
304 (1956) [hereinafter cited as BRUNER]. "Mhe Hopi language and culture conceals
a METAPHYSICS...." B. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY 58 (1956).
"We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages." Id. at 213.
The Whorfian hypothesis, that language strongly influences the culture in which it oper-
ates, is now undergoing critical review. See 1 S. HOOK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY
(1969). But, if or however they interact, there is no dispute that a language and its re-
lated culture are tightly interlocked. See also S. ULLMANN, LANGUAGE AND STYLE
214-15 (1964). On class formation and the philosophical implications of nominalism
1972]
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For this reason, language has been called a "conceptual map of hu-
man experience. ' 7 As is characteristic of any map, it has little or no
significance apart from the reality that it mirrors; and messages ex-
pressed in a particular language will have no significance apart from
what that language mirrors.
The underlying cultural elements that provide the materials of
context include: (1) the pervasive matrix or grid of concepts pre-
supposed by the language of that culture;8 and (2) the coordinate
fund of habits, knowledge, values, and purposes that are shared by
the great bulk of the speech community of which both author and
audience are members.
The first of these two aspects of culture gives language its pri-
mary referents or meanings.9  Besides providing the substance of
dictionary meanings, it provides the meanings of those particular
word combinations whose incidence has been high enough to create
identifiable habits of psychological response. For the users of the
particular language, this response to primary meanings is automatic
and immediate,'" without necessarily being behavioristic in the Pav-
lovian sense.
The primary or potential meanings of all utterances are inextri-
cably woven into the second cultural aspect - the general fabric of
basic knowledge and assumptions, express or tacit, that are shared
by the users of the language. These cultural elements condition and
color the primary and potential word-meanings furnished by the first
cultural aspect." This is perhaps the most important function of
context in the dynamics of communication.
in this area, see 1. E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 278-302
(1953); BRUNER, i4. at 1-24; W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 233-76 (1960).
7 E. NIDA, supra note 2, at 80.
81d. at 70-71.
Old. at 58.
10 C. CHERRY, supra note 2, at 12.
11 "[T]he 'larger context' - the whole discourse or the whole experience of the
speaker or the whole language - cumulatively colors each word as it occurs against one
background after another." D. BOLINGER, ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE 229 (1968). Fur-
thermore, one author has observed that: "'[M]eaning' will depend upon the listener,
upon the speaker, upon their entire experience of the language, upon their knowledge
of one another, and upon the whole situation." C. CHERRY, supra note 2, at 10. Also:
Words are partly known by their backgrounds, their pasts, like men; and like
men they do not have their full significance when standing alone but are
known by the company they keep. A word is essentially contained in a con-
text and the full effect of a word is felt only when it appears in context. Id.
at 72.
See also G. STERN, MEANING AND CHANGE OF MEANING 144 (1931), where the au-
thor has stated that: "[Cjontext 'prepares' the correct interpretation of the words by
indicating at least the direction or sphere in which the topic is to be sought, and in many
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The following example will help identify the two aspects at work.
If Congress enacts an income tax statute requiring the taxpayer to
compute his tax according to a specified formula, the psychological
response habits that give meaning and significance to individual terms
such as "compute," or that identify the relevant syntactical elements,
are derived from the first cultural aspect - the matrix of concepts.
On the other hand, the generally accepted assumption (usually omit-
ted from statutes) that fractions of a half-cent or more are to be
rounded off to the next higher cent, exemplifies the second cultural
aspect - the fund of commonly shared assumptions and knowl-
edge. As part of the relevant surrounding context, it conditions the
specified formula for computing the tax: unless a different rule is ex-
pressed in the statute, the normal taxpayer will assume that the statu-
tory language intends fractional amounts encountered in the comput-
ation of his tax to be so treated.1" Here, the elements of surrounding
context condition"3 the primary meanings otherwise provided by the
cultural matrix of concepts.
B. The General Nature and Workings of Context
Although the word "context" is sometimes used by lawyers to
denote the cultural environment taken in its entirety, it is more prop-
erly used either (1) in the narrower sense of the surrounding coordi-
nate fund of relevant assumptions taken into account by the lan-
guage vehicle, or (2) in the still narrower sense of the internal
syntactical structure of the message. It is in these two senses that the
word "context" will be used in this discussion. Environment in its
cases it indicates the topic much more precisely: we know what the other man is talking
about."
12 A more significant, though less obvious, example is found in a case like Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), where under one approach the interpreta-
tive issue is whether a statute that permits beneficiaries to enforce wills according to their
terms impliedly excludes those who murder their testators, the implication being based
on the general legal assumption that wrongdoers are disqualified from benefiting from
their wrongs.
13 "Communication can take place because a speaker encodes a message using the
same linguistic rules that his bearer uses to decode it." J. KATZ, supra note 6, at 102.
The speaker must know the limits within which he may assume a correspon-
dence of imagery. When the context of the item under discussion is in the
physical view of both, or is shared because of similarity of past experiences,
or is implicitly present by virtue of a history of former interaction, the prob-
lem of context is largely solved. But when the context is neither so provided
nor offered by the speaker, the listener is confronted with knotty problems of
interpretation. Schatzman & Strauss, Social Class and Modes of Consuzunica-
tion, in CoMMtJNIcATioN AND CULTURE 444-45 (A. Smith ed. 1966).
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total aspect is simply the cultural fund out of which specific context
in each particular case is drawn.
From what has been said, it is not enough that author and audi-
ence share merely the document being interpreted. Author commu-
nicates to audience only so far as they also share the same general
cultural environment and, within that environment, the same relevant
habits,14 knowledge, values, and purposes. In the interpretation of
the document, it must be assumed that the author has taken this
necessary presupposition of communication into account.15  Actual
meaning, therefore, is relative to particular presuppositions relating
to both document and context. If we are interested in communica-
tion, we must not ask, "What does this particular document, taken
by itself, mean ?" We must ask, "What does this document mean in
its proper context?"
The importance of context in the interpretation of statutes has
long been recognized by the courts. The argot of the judiciary is
laced with key phrases that reflect the effect of context on meaning.
The canons reddendo singula singulis, ejusdem generis, and noscitur
a sociis,"6 for example, related to the meanings of words and phrases
in the internal context of a sentence, paragraph, or section. The
"whole-document rule" relates to the meaning of particular segments
in the context of the rest of the statute. In pari materia relates,
among other things, to the meaning of particular statutes in the con-
text of other statutes. The rule that permits examination of legisla-
tive committee reports relates to the examination of segments in the
supposed context of the legislative history. The principle that per-
mits a court to take into account what is judicially noticeable relates
to the meaning of particular segments in the total relevant social con-
text.
But, although the law may affect the factual presuppositions
of document and context, it does not affect the basic principles of
14 The backbone of language consists not of rules, but of "regularities." See P.
ZIFF, SEMANIc ANALYSIS 34-36 (1960).
15 "Successful communication involves a good deal of mutual adjustment, for the
source must consider the backgrounds of the audience, and vice versa." E. NDA, supra
note 2, at 71. This is the essence of the editorial point of view.
Although meaning thus presupposes that author and audience share the essential
elements of communication, it does not, however, determine what is in fact shared, nor
does it determine what is to be considered "message" and what is to be considered sur-
rounding "context."
16 Black defines these Latin phrases as follows: reddendo singula singulis - referring
each phrase to its appropriate object; ejusdem generis - of the same kind, class, or na-
ture; noscitur a sociis - the meaning of a word is or may be known from the accom-
panying words. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1442, 608, 1209 (4th ed. 1951).
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meaning as they apply to those presuppositions. Thus, judicial rules
that determine what a court may look at, as distinct from how the
court may look at it, may be rules of law that condition or other-
wise set the stage for the later process of interpretation, but they
are not themselves rules of interpretation in the sense of rules that
reveal meaning. For example, the restrictive plain meaning rule
and the English prohibition against resort to legislative history are
rules of law that help to define the object of interpretation and
select part of the context, but they are not themselves principles of
interpretation.
It is important to note that some of the above rules of interpreta-
tion relate to matters of context that are internal to the document
as a whole, while others relate to matters of context that are external
to it. Matters of internal context - intra-language matters normally
within the control of the draftsman - are custom-tailored to the
purposes of the particular communication. Here, according to Pro-
fessor Black, the "key problem is that of accounting for the interac-
tion of symbols .... -,17 a problem that philosophical grammarians
and language theorists have not yet adequately solved. Matters ex-
ternal to the document'- for the most part extra-language matters
beyond the draftsman's direct control - must be accepted as they are,
except so far as he can compensate in- the document for their inade-
juacies.18 These include the matters that he assumes will be taken
for granted by his audience as conditioning the message. In this
sense, therefore, external context can be regarded as the part of a
communication that has already been delivered.
What does the surrounding context consist of in a particular case?
On one hand, if we look for the meaning of a statute as a whole,
the context consists of related statutes and case law and the coordi-
nate fund of shared habits, knowledge, values, and purposes external
to that statute. In general, these are official or unofficial matters of
which courts are willing to take judicial notice. That some relate
to facts and others to legal and ethical norms is neatly summarized in
Professor Hall's term "factual-normative contexts."' 9  On the other
hand, if we look for the meaning of a particular word, phrase, sen-
tence, paragraph, or section, the surrounding context also includes
the relevant factors, outside the item under examination, contained
in the statute itself. As a general statement then, one can say that
17 M. BLAcK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN METHOD 206 (1949).
18 See note 4 supra.
19J. ALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 46 (2d ed. 1960).
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the material of proper context is the totality of relevant factors in
the general cultural environment external to the specific language
being interpreted that are shared by the users of the language in the
particular speech community and taken into account by the particular
communication.
What is the relationship between the document being interpreted
and its surrounding context? The document is central, because it
is the main instrumentality relied on by the author to carry his mes-
sage. Having received his closest attention, it is the strongest and
most dynamic element among those on which an understanding of
the communication depends. Under normal circumstances, nothing
else has equal dignity or significance in marking out the content of
his communication. Surrounding context plays a supporting, sub-
ordinate role.
Although subordinate, the role of surrounding context is highly
significant. An utterance taken out of the specific context that it
presupposes is at best inadequately oriented and over-general. Not
only does the surrounding context limit the normal sweep of primary
(semantical) meaning, but it often selects among the alternative
potentialities of primary meaning.2° The elements of context that
perform this latter function are usually factual assumptions or ethi-
cal norms that are either expressly recited in the document or, more
usually, judicially noticed. They affect meaning by turning the po-
tentialities of multiple, or alternative, primary meanings into the
actualities of a single relevant primary meaning. For example, they
may resolve ambiguities ("To be eligible to vote, your residence must
be in the State") or merely select the appropriate alternative in a
bundle of homonyms ("He means to use illegal means").
The most useful, indeed almost indispensable, function of sur-
rounding context is to narrow the range of reference of otherwise
over-general words. 21  Without it, all but the simplest communica-
20 "[T]he immediate context, by cancelling out those known meanings of a word
that are inappropriate, leaves the one meaning that fits." D. BOLINGER, supra note 11,
at 229. However, "context may serve an extremely subtle function - as with puns, or
double entendre." C. CHERRY, supra note 2, at 10. "The most important safeguard
against homonymic ambiguity is ... the influence of context." S. ULLMANN, supra note
6, at 79.
21 See B. NIDA, supra note 2, where the author stated that:
[A] word in isolation (i.e., without context) begins with a very wide area of
meaning, for it may occur in many hundreds of situations and may be used as
a label for scores of objects; but by means of the practical and linguistic con-
texts in which it is used we can "whittle it down" to precisely that subarea of
meaning it must have in any specific utterance. Id. at 77.
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tions would be intolerably long. Consider Wittgenstein's famous
example:
Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I teach them
gaming -with dice, and the other says "I didn't mean that sort of
game." 22
Although Wittgenstein was questioning whether the speaker con-
sciously adverted, in his request, to the exclusion of gaming with
dice, his example well illustrates the point. The shared expecta-
tions likely to exist in such a situation strongly imply the qualifica-
tion, "suitable, under our common standards of value, to children of
their ages, abilities, and temperaments."
The benefits to communication resulting from being able to rely
on habits, knowledge, values, and purposes that are already shared
by the participants have never been illustrated more vividly than in
Lieber's example, from which the reader is invited to pick out the
underlying tacit assumptions.
Suppose a housekeeper says to a domestic: "fetch some soup-
meat," accompanying the act with giving some money to the latter:
he will be unable to execute the order without interpretation, how-
ever easy, and, consequently, rapid the performance of the process
may be. Common sense and good faith tell the domestic, that the
housekeeper's meaning was this: 1. He should go -immediately, or
as soon as his other occupations are finished; or, if he be directed
to do so in the evening, that he should go the next day at the usual
hour; 2. that the money handed him by the 'housekeeper is intended
to pay for the meat thus ordered, and not as a present to him; 3.
that he should buy such meat and of such parts of the animal,
as, to his knowledge, has commonly been used in the house he
stays at, for making soups; 4. that he buy the best meat he can
obtain, for a fair price; 5. that he go to that butcher who usually
provides the family, with whom the domestic resides, with meat,
or to some convenient stall, and not to any unnecessarily distant
place; 6. that he return the rest of the money; 7. that he bring
home the meat in good faith, neither adding any thing disagree-
able nor injurious; 8. that he fetch the meat for the use of the
family and not for himself. Suppose, on the other hand, the house-
keeper, afraid of being -misunderstood, had mentioned these eight
specifications, she would not have obtained her object, if it were
to exclude all possibility of misunderstanding. For, the various
specifications would have required new ones. Where would be
the end? We are constrained then, always, to leave a considerable
part of our meaning to be found out by interpretation, which, in
many cases must necessarily cause greater or less obscurity with
regard to the exact meaning, which our words were intended to
convey
2 3
2 2 L WITGENSTEIN, PHnLOSOPMCAL VESTIGATIONS 33 (1953).
2 3 F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HIRumNEumcs- 28-30 (1839).
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In the above example, as in all communications, context could
perform its function of narrowing the range of reference only be-
cause the specific communications that it conditioned were grounded
on commonly understood purposes. The relevant assumptions that
the hearer needed to make were cued by the implicit purpose of the
speaker's words. An understanding of this role played by purpose
is indispensible to an understanding of the interplay between a spe-
cific message and its context.
In general, the relevant context is ascertainable only from the
criterion of relevance provided by the purpose or intent of the mes-
sage. The latter, in turn, is discoverable in most cases mainly from
the document that is itself the object of inquiry, but only as that
document is conditioned by its proper context. In such cases, there-
fore, we can ascertain the meaning of a document only if we al-
ready know what it means! The paradox dissolves, however, when
we realize that every communication has some clear elements of
primary (semantical) meaning that imply shared elements in the
underlying culture and specific context. Together, the clear elements
and relevant surrounding context tend to disclose the immediate pur-
pose or group of purposes that the document is intended to ac-
complish. This, in turn, aids in resolving the residual uncertainties.
Some effects of the interaction between context and primary mean-
ing are automatic.2 4  Others are aided by conscious inference or de-
duction. Because primary meaning tends to merge with meaning
attributable to context, it is hard or impossible to differentiate
sharply between them in specific instances.2 5
It is arguable, for example, that the meaning of the phrase "parol
evidence rule" is for the most part contextual (syntactical), because
it transcends the primary meanings of the words "parol," "evidence,"
and "rule." The meaning of the phrase "interpretation of statutes"
also is partly contextual, because the meaning of a phrase or sen-
tence is normally a function not only of the primary meanings of its
2 E. NIDA, supra note 2, at 63.
2 What we now hear on every side is that the boundary between syntax and
semantics is not a sharp one; that the interplay of syntactics and semantic fea-
tures is a general phenomenon in language.... The rules constituting the
meaning of a word are - up to a point - not different in principle from
those establishing its "syntactic" status. Nyiri, No Place For Semantics, in 7
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 56, 58 (1971).
The extent, if any, to which these fields interact or overlap need not detain us here. Syn-
tax is, of course, part of the microcontext.
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constituent words26 but also of the syntactical rules by which they
are combined.
On the other hand, the phrase "parol evidence rule" differs from
the phrase "interpretation of statutes" in that the former has a mean-
ing that cannot be derived from constituent primary meanings and
syntactical rules. The whole transcends its parts.2 7 It may be pref-
erable, therefore, to say that the meaning of the phrase "parol evi-
dence rule" is for the most part primary and only incidentally con-
textual. Conceivably, the latter might even be represented by the
one word, "parolevidencerule," or preferably (but for established
usage) by a word whose elements did not suggest an aggregate mean-
ing so significantly different from its actual meaning.
If this analysis is correct, contextual meaning, so far as it depends
on the internal structure of a document, is the meaning that is based
on the special though systematic ordering of verbal elements that
have primary meaning - the smallest of which are called "mor-
phemes." '  Primary meaning, on the other hand, is the meaning or
potential meaning, other than contextual, that usage attaches to par-
ticular words and phrases and that persists even when the language
unit is viewed apart from surrounding context. (This distinction
corresponds generally to that between the implied and the express.)
This differentiation does not imply that a phrase such as "inter-
pretation of statutes," unlike the phrase "parol evidence rule," is
grasped in three visual acts instead of one. Each of these phrases,
having a high degree of recurrence, is normally read as an estab-
lished unit, just as in the performance of music a recurrent cluster
of notes is read as a unit rather than note by note. The important
distinction between the two phrases is that a person unfamiliar with
the unit but familiar with its constituent elements can construct its
correct meaning in the one case but not in the other.
Primary meaning is also related to contextual meaning in another,
and different, sense. Like all habits, the psychological response
habit that constitutes the primary meaning of a particular language
element exists only because of its recurrence in a succession of earlier,
2 6 
"In general, the meaning of a phrase can be determined by adding up the mean-
ings of the constituent parts (such phrases may be called endocentric)." E. NIDA, supra
note 2, at 82.
27 "This type of expression may be called semantically exocentric, for the meaning
of the whole is not the sum total of the parts." Id. See also G. STERN, supra note 11,
at 155.
28 . NIDA, supra note 2, at 63. A "morpheme" is the smallest meaningful linguis-
tic element, having no smaller meaningful parts; i.e., the letter s in the word pins.
WEBsTER's THIED NEw INTERNATiONAL DIcTIONARY (P. Gove ed. 1961).
19721
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 353
similar contexts. Thus, the primary meaning of a word or phrase
is a continuing echo of a general theme previously heard in many
specific and generally similar contexts. Words in the isolation of a
vocabulary list, says Benjamin Whorf, "derive what meaning they
have from the patterned 'potentials of linkage.' "29 Any assertion
that language is meaningless apart from specific context or that
"words . . . 'mean' nothing by themselves" 80 denies Whorf's theory
by falsely implying that language conveys meaning only through:
(1) current syntactical relationships (context internal to the docu-
ment); and (2) the specific relationships between the language used
and other relevant factors, existing in the given speech community,
that are shared by the author and his audience (context external to
the document) .3 It is more accurate to say that an utterance taken
out of the specific context that it presupposes is at best overgeneral
or uncertain.
Although primary meaning, like other habits or conditioned re-
sponses, is thus rooted in past recurrences, contextual meaning is
meaning that, whether or not recurrent, flows from current configur-
ations or words, collateral facts, and express or tacit collateral as-
sumptions. To say that unique messages can be communicated only
by unique combinations of language elements in unique surround-
ings does not, however, mean that the syntactical strands by which
such elements are combined in a specific case are themselves unique.
The meaning of a unique utterance is a function not only of estab-
lished verbal patterns but also of established syntactical patterns,
and both reflect the general patterns of surrounding context. Those
syntactical patterns result in relationships that can be said to carry
primary meaning in the same sense and in the same way as particu-
lar concrete verbal elements such as nouns and verbs.
In the sentence "Man bites dog," the applicable syntactical rule
can be roughly described as one requiring the word denoting the
actor to be placed before the word denoting transitive action and
the word denoting the person affected by the action to be placed af-
ter it. Although syntactical rules are not included in the usual dic-
tionary, they are analogous to the definitions of words or phrases.
29 B. WHoRF, supra note 6, at 67 n.4.
30 E.g., C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 12 (1923); C.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 474 (6th ed. 1958); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4505 (3d ed. 1943); A. Ross, ON LAW AND JuSTIcE
113 (1959).
31 "[A]ll familiar words carry some meaning even when uttered in isolation. ...
Their meaning is potential rather than actual until they are linked to other words." J.
DEWEY, supra note 6, at 349. See also note 21 supra.
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Together, the primary meanings of words and phrases and the pri-
mary meanings of particular syntactical arrangements make it pos-
sible to form unique combinations and meanings that draw their
uniqueness from those contexts.
C. Sharing the Elements of Context
As the author has mentioned above, communication is possible
only when the response habits and collateral assumptions necessary
to an understanding of that communication are shared by the author
and his particular audience. Furthermore, in the case of a legal
communication such as a statute or regulation, that communication
cannot be officially applied or interpreted unless the underlying re-
sponse habits and collateral assumptions are shared also by the en-
forcing or interpreting authority.3" Author, audience, and monitor-
ing authority must all operate within the language system presup-
posed by the particular communication. All three must be users of
the same language and to this extent members of the same general
speech community. This is important in the interpretation of stat-
utes, particularly with respect to: (1) statutes whose relevant cul-
tural environment has changed significantly since their enactment;
(2) statutes that have been enacted in imitation of statutes in other
jurisdictions or otherwise use terms that have already been judicially
defined; and (3) the use of legislative history and other extrinsic
aids.
Unfortunately, the civilized world is not composed of discrete,
mutually exclusive cultures, uncomplicated with subcultures. Rather,
it is composed of vaguely defined, sometimes overlapping, and some-
times competing cultures that on closer examination subdivide into
at least as vaguely defined, overlapping, and competing subcultures
and sub-subcultures. Each of these progressively smaller subcultures
is a correspondingly more diminutive congeries of partly shared and
partly divergent assumptions and moral attitudes, ending at the mi-
crocosmic extreme with the assumptions and attitudes shared by a
single author and a single reader or listener.
Specific context, therefore, always relates to a particular audi-
ence in a particular culture or subculture identified by a particular
speech community. A speech community or relevant language sys-
tem is usually defined, not by a group of specific people, but by
kinds of activities or fields of interests.33 This is not only true of
32 See notes 2, 13 supra.
33 On the general concept of speech community, see L. BLOOMFIEILD, LANGUAGE
42-56 (1933).
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major speech communities and languages identified with radically
differing cultures but is especially true of the secondary speech com-
munities and special languages and technical dialects that exist in
highly complicated cultures such as our own. The same person may
participate in more than one speech community or be the user of
more than one language. For example, a botanist may call a tomato
a "fruit" when talking with a colleague but a "vegetable" when
talking to his grocer.
For these reasons, the legislative draftsman should carefully ap-
praise the audience or audiences to which his statute is addressed
and the speech communities in which those audiences are found. 4
A statute addressed primarily to government officials may need to be
written differently from one addressed to a part of the business com-
munity or to the public at large. As with communications generally,
the nature of the author's audience affects not only his choice of lan-
guage and appropriate sublanguage or technical dialect, but his esti-
mate of the range of relevant assumptions he can take for granted
as already shared by the particular audience. Understanding this
audience is important also for one who presumes to declare what
the communication means.
This concept of "legislative audience" and the broader concept
of "the users of a language"3 5 are complicated by the irregularity
with which habits, knowledge, values, and purposes tend to be shared
even within the same speech community."' The concepts of legisla-
tive audience and users of the language are further complicated by
the fact that some statutes are not normally read or intended to be
read by the persons to whom they directly apply. Such statutes be-
come known mainly through instrumentalities such as the bar or the
executive branch of the government, or through private editorial ser-
vices operating with legal advice. Perhaps the best example is the
federal income tax laws. Although these laws affect almost everyone,
few laymen understand or even become acquainted with their terms
84 R. DICKERSON, supra note 5, at 19.
3 M. BLACK, supra note 17, at 29, 49.
36 This irregularity often goes unnoticed. "We remain unconscious of the prodi-
gious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language
makes everything alike." L. WrcrGENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 224. Some writers, on
the other hand, do notice and make allowances for the problem. Recognizing the fact
of variant usages and individual aberrations, Professor Black has tried to develop appro-
priate principles of exclusion leading to a more discriminating, if not wholly scientific,
selection of the persons whose usages should be accepted in determining what particular
language usages and factual assumptions should be taken into account in statutory in-
terpretation. M. BLACK, supra note 17, at 49, 51. For the foreseeable future, however,
courts will have to content themselves with having to operate on a curbstone basis.
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from a direct reading. Most tax information is delivered by word of
mouth or through official instructions of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, private periodicals or services, or private legal or accounting
advice. Because this process is inevitable, such laws need not be
couched in a form that makes easy reading for the public at large,
nor need their factual presuppositions be made obvious to the public.
It is enough that the statutes are understood by the governmental
and private lawyers and accountants who specialize in the field and
on whom the public customarily relies. For the purpose of interpre-
tation, such of the terminology and total relevant environment as is
shared by legislature, tax bar, and tax accountants generally can be
taken as shared on behalf of the general public.
At this point, it would be easy to be carried away by the desire
to be "realistic" and to overemphasize the obvious fact that few
members of a legislative audience ever read any of the legislative
provisions that directly affect their activities, including those of a non-
technical nature that contemplate no intermediary. It would then
be tempting to conclude that all references to "actual" or "true"
meaning are as fictitious and baseless as the fictitious assumption
that the legislative communication is in fact received in the form in
which it was enacted. But one should not forget that the legislative
audience is ultimately informed about the statute by the few mem-
bers or intermediaries who do read it. Moreover, the legislature is
concerned only with providing a reasonable opportunity to read the
legislative message. If a typical member of the legislative audience
chooses not to enjoy this opportunity, that is his privilege. But if
he does choose to read the statute, he is entitled to read it in a
manner normal to the language used and the context in which it has
been presented to that audience.
To what extent is a court itself a representative member of the
legislative audience, or an intermediary on behalf of that audience?
Are not all statutes addressed to the courts as judicial intermediaries
and the official arbiters of meaning? If so, it should be enough that,
in any particular case, the relevant habits, knowledge, values, and
purposes are shared by the legislature and the court, because this
provides means by which the legislative message may be sent in
dearer form to the persons to whom the statute is ultimately directed.
Such a conclusion would make sense to anyone operating under
the view that legislation is meaningless until it passes through a
judicial filter. But this view - that the court is the ultimate law
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giver" even in the case of statutes - is not widely held, and some of
its factual assumptions are false. Most statutes are enacted and
obeyed with no help from the courts.3 8 Legislative draftsmen do not
ordinarily address their legislative communications to the courts, nor
do they assume that the courts are the normal channel to the legisla-
tive audience. Judges may participate in the interpretation of a
statute as members of a broader professional group which, it is rea-
sonable to suppose, the legislature took into account in framing
the statute. But any special knowledge that the court may have
concerning the circumstances of the legislation, including the rea-
sons for its enactment, is not a part of proper context for the pur-
poses of ascertaining the meaning of the statute, if that knowledge
is not shared by the persons to whom the statute is primarily ad-
dressed.
Anyone engaged in even a preliminary ascertainment of the
meaning that a statute will have for the persons to whom it is ulti-
mately addressed, must examine it against the habits, knowledge,
values, and purposes that are assumedly shared with the legislature
by typical members of that audience or the intermediaries to which
the audience normally looks for enlightenment. For this reason, in-
formation that is not available to the legislative audience, no mat-
ter how relevant and reliable it may be, and even though it may
be available to the court, cannot be considered part of the proper
context of the statute. To treat it as part of that context would be
to subvert an essential presupposition of communication, that of
shared environment. This is the problem that haunts the users
of at least some elements of legislative history. 9
Normally, context consists of information and assumptions al-
ready shared by the sender and his audience. However, to be part
of context it is unnecessary that the audience have the specific mate-
3"J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 171-72 (2d ed. R. Gray
1921).
3 8 Gray's theory has been attacked by many commentators. One writer has said:
[Gray's] view of statutes seems narrow and misleading. First, it over-em-
phasizes the "trouble case" that leads to litigation. Statutes are law, are used
by laymen and counsellors and officials ... in many instances without the aid
of judicial interpretation. 'When the federal income tax law is amended,
most men pay their taxes without waiting to see whether, in a test case, the
court will hold that John Doe has to pay. R. PA=TERSON, JURiSPRUDENCE
- MENAND IDEAS OF THE LAW 199 (1953).
"[There are many parts of many statutes which have never been the subject of judicial
interpretation at all, but which are unquestionably the law of the land." C. ALLEN,
LAW IN THE MAKING 486 (6th ed. 1958).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 345 U.S. 295
(1953). In particular see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson. Id. at 319.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
rial already in mind, so long as another shared assumption can rea-
sonably be expected to lead to it. For example, the sender may use
a word of established meaning, knowing that the audience is unfa-
miliar with the word, because it is reasonable to expect that the
audience will or can consult a standard dictionary. Here, one shared
assumption (that the recipient will consult an accepted dictionary)
functionally incorporates another (the intended, accepted meaning
of the word in question). The meaning of the word is a part of
particular context, even though the recipient does not yet know what
it is.
Similarly, a person may effectively communicate in code with
one who cannot read the message directly, if the recipient knows
about and has access to the applicable code book and shares the
assumption that it will be referred to. Here, too, the meanings of
the various symbols are part of the context of the message, because
the means of access are shared and it is understood by both parties
that those means are to be used. Context, therefore, consists of
shared knowledge and the established shared bridges to such knowl-
edge.
D. "Taking into Account": The Reliance Factor
Of all the aspects of context, perhaps the most subtle is the fact
that it is something that both parties to a successful communication
not merely share but subjectively take into account. Relevant as-
sumptions may remain tacit if the author is correct in assuming that
he already shares them with his audience and that the express aspects
of the message will be read in the light of those assumptions. Thus,
a communication is invariably a combination of the express and the
implied. The system works so long as author and audience share
not only the relevant semantic and substantive assumptions but also
the habits of association that make it probable that those assump-
tions will have the same conditioning effect on express meaning for
audience that they have for the author.
In view of the necessary function that this aspect of communi-
cation performs, it is remarkable that it is almost never expressly
recognized, at least in print. Professor Shartel touched upon the
matter while emphasizing the importance of shared context: "[I]deal-
ly we hope that both legislator and interpreter act in the light of
the same context. °40 The noted Danish commentator, Alf Ross,
was perhaps closer to the target when he said:
4 0 B. S-ARTEL, supra note 1, at 330 (emphasis added).
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The context extends just as far as one may assume that one utter-
ance was formulated with another in mind.... The situation com-
prises all facts and circumstances which can provide an indication
of 'what the author's intention was. This can include . . . the
whole factual, physical and social situation of living which condi-
tioned the utterance.41
Professor Fuller has reminded us that the parties may take tacit
assumptions into account without being fully conscious of doing so;
a person is not always aware of what he takes for granted.4 2  But
that fact in no way lessens his actual reliance, and this is true at both
ends of the communication process. Being based ultimately on
habit, the conditioned responses involved in the communication of
meaning are for the most part automatic. That they may also be
inadvertent does not weaken their effect or lessen their importance.
The concept of "taking into account" is important because, if
valid, many of the elements of legislative history that some courts have
been routinely taking into account under the banner of legislative
"context" may need to be reevaluated. The full range of prob-
lems involved in examining "legislative history" deserve fuller treat-
ment than is appropriate on this occasion. The point to be empha-
sized here, and of which legislative history is merely the most
dramatic example, is that the way a particular language vehicle takes
into account the approprate elements of context determines to a
large extent the success or failure of the communication. Lack of
attention to this factor is the reason why so many legislative commun-
ications have failed to convey what the legislature intended or have
required judicial interpretation in their application. For example,
a statute that relies significantly on collateral assumptions that are
unshared, or only imperfectly shared, with the legislative audience
is likely to misfire. Similarly, a statute that fails to suggest the af-
finity between the legislature's language and the shared assumptions
that it has relied on to supplement that language may be seen off-
center by the legislative audience. An editorial point of view is as
critical for the manipulation of the external context as it is for the
manipulation of the language itself.
One final comment should be made concerning this reliance fac-
41 A. Ross, supra note 30, at 116 (emphasis added).
4 2 The absent-minded professor stepping from his office into the hail as he
reads a book "assumes" that the floor of the hall will be there to receive him.
His conduct is conditioned and directed by this assumption, even though the
possibility that the floor has been removed does not "occur" to him, that is,
is not present in his mental processes. L. FULLER, SOME FALLAcIEs iN THE-
ORIEs ABOUT INTERPRETATION 5 (mimeo. paper for Legal Philosophy Dis-
cussion Group, Feb. 3, 1959).
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tor. If a collateral statement is not taken into account by the writ-
ten document, it cannot be part of the intended message, no matter
how relevant, reliable, and fully shared it may be. Thus, a collateral
statement of what a statute means is not part of its context, because,
instead of buttressing the statute, it competes with it as an expres-
sion of legislative intent. If it has force, it can have it only as an
independent legislative statement, in which case it has direct force
only if it has been enacted.
E. Compromising the Ideal
How detailed and refined should the examination of contextual
materials be? As one commentator has noted: "The full effect of a
word upon its hearers may depend not only upon the [internal)
context but upon the whole physical and psychological environment
and, on many occasions, upon his experience of the culture of which
the language forms an integral part."43 This has been dramatically
illustrated in the translations of the Bible, which have appeared in
more than 200 languages. Here, according to Nida, "the exegetical
analysis of any message consists in reconstructing, in so far as pos-
sible, all the significance of the communicative event within the
totality of the cultural framework. '' 44  He adds, however, that it is
false "to assume that in order to communicate one must reproduce
all the circumstances of one culture within some isolated segment of
another . . . . 45 It is enough that he "select . . . these features
which are culturally relevant .... .". What is true for the com-
municator is true also for the interpreter.
For a court, the attempt to reconstruct the author's relevant en-
vironment poses an additional problem. Here the aim is not so much
to capture every nuance of true meaning as it is to maintain stan-
dards of determinability reliable enough to provide a working basis
for resolving particular controversies, predicting their probable out-
come, and planning generally for the future. Considerations such as
these have forced the courts, and the readers of statutes generally, to
be highly selective when looking beyond the document being inter-
preted, hopefully avoiding subtleties that are hard to capture and
thus minimizing the risk of great controversy. Fortunately, the com-
promise is not as great as it might appear at first glance. The sub-
43 C. CHERRY, supra note 2, at 75.
44 E. NMIA, supra note 2, at 39.
451d. at 58.
46 Id. at 59.
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sidiary elements in the broader context that may have to be ignored
probably contribute more to the emotive aspects of language than to
the non-emotive aspects of which legislative pronouncements are al-
most entirely composed.
The foregoing considerations are important in determining what
elements, outside the statute itself, the interpreter may or should
look at in performing the cognitive function. Only by a discrimina-
tory evaluation of the materials of context can the interpreter arrive
at a pronounced meaning that adequately approximates true mean-
ing.
It is in the area of practical compromise that the cognitive rules
for ascertaining legislative meaning tend to merge with the cre-
ative rules for assigning judicial meaning, thus blurring the vital dis-
tinction between them. This blurring usually results when relevant
information that should be rejected for the purposes of cognition
may later be useful to the creative function of judicial law-making
in supplementing the statute. By considering a factor that has been
denied to the legislative audience, the court in effect supplements or
changes the true meaning of the communication as enacted.
Whether this is appropriate under the circumstances depends on
principles other than those that govern cognition.
III. Conclusion
Whenever the House of Representatives, the Senate, or the Presi-
dent puts an imprimatur on an otherwise properly processed bill,
that imprimatur supports, not the written document taken in isola-
tion, but the document as conditioned by the surrounding context of
relevant shared assumptions that it takes account of and that to-
gether with it comprise the total communication. On the other hand,
a collateral utterance, however relevant and reliable, that is not as-
sumed to be shared by the legislative audience is necessarily ex-
cluded. Such an element is not part of what has constitutionally
been put before that audience and mere relevance cannot make it
such a part. It cannot affect the true meaning of the statute being
interpreted because it cannot comply with the standards of proper
context. If it is taken into account, it must be handled as an aspect
of judicial law-making subject to the principles governing that ac-
tivity.
If this analysis is correct, courts in the performance of their cog-
nitive (as distinct from creative) function with respect to statutes
should pay closer attention to whether the extrinsic materials that
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they consult meet the tests of. "context." This is particularly true of
the materials of legislative history.
